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THE FUTURE OF PARITY
MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE*

INTRODUCTION

In the dual enforcement of constitutional norms in the United
States, state governmental institutions, and particularly state
courts, are entrusted with adjudicating federal constitutional and
statutory rights. That dual regime, in turn, gives rise to the issue
of "parity," the concept that state judges are presumed at some level
to be as "willing and capable of giving claims" of federal rights a fair
hearing as would federal judges.' I will address the future of parity
by first considering its past.
To do that, I will reexamine an article by the late Paul M. Bator,
presented at a symposium in January of 1981 at William and Mary
School of Law, and published in its Law Review. 2 Bator was a
prominent law professor at Harvard and the University of Chicago,3
* Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. An
earlier version of this Article was presented at the Conference on Dual Enforcement of
Constitutional Norms, sponsored by the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at William and Mary
School of Law on November 14, 2003. Thanks to Barry Friedman, Martin Redish, and Jim
Walker for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. Any errors that remain are mine.
1. MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE
INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 59 (1999); see also id. at 58 (distinguishing between
"weak parity," described in the text, and "strong parity," which assumes that state and
federal courts are fungible).
2. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and FederalConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 605 (1981). The symposium issue had additional contributions by
distinguished federal courts scholars Martha Field, Burt Neuborne, and the late Robert
Cover, and by several judges, including then Arizona Court of Appeals Judge Sandra D.
O'Connor. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of JurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest, Ideology,
and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981); Martha A. Field, The UncertainNature
of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 683 (1981); Burt Neuborne, Toward
ProceduralParity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1981); Sandra
D. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the
Perspectiveof a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981).
3. Bator passed away in 1989. For a brief summary of his professional career, see
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best known for being a co-author of the influential federal courts
case book, Hart & Wechsler's the Federal Courts and the Federal
System.4 As we shall see, Bator gave, in my view, extremely
thoughtful and prescient consideration to a host of issues raised by
parity, and to other issues subsumed by the present conference.5
Before turning to some of those issues in detail, I will briefly
summarize his article.
Bator began by considering first principles. Why, he asked, "do
the state courts have a role" at all in adjudicating federal constitutional rights?' At first blush, it might seem that federal courts
should be the primary (or perhaps exclusive) fora for the litigation
of federal rights, whereas state courts should perform a similar role

Charles Fried, PaulBator, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 419 (1989); see also SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra
note 1, at 120-21 n.57 (giving other examples of the influence of Bator's scholarship on
federal courts jurisprudence). One of Professor Bator's articles even found its way into a
dissent in the storied Bush v. Gore litigation. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 136-37 (2000)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963)); see also id. at 137
(citing O'Connor, supra note 2).
4. Bator was a co-author of the second and third editions of the book. See PAUL M.
BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed.
1988); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973).
5. Thoughtful observers on various sides of the parity discussion have recognized the
probity of Bator's article. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Under the Law of FederalJurisdiction:
Allocating Cases Between Federaland State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1241 (2004)
(referring to the article as 'Justly renowned').
6. Bator, supra note 2, at 606. Bator's article, like this one, was concerned mainly with
the adjudication of federal constitutional rights in state courts, in both civil (e.g., cases
brought under federal causes of action, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and criminal (e.g., issues
typically raised by defendants) litigation. There is little direct discussion of state court
litigation raising federal statutory rights (e.g., under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)). The latter type of litigation raises various issues
regarding parity that considerably overlap with constitutional litigation. See SOLIMINE &
WALKER, supra note 1, at 63-85. And, of course, a particular state court case can raise both
constitutional and statutory issues under federal law. Nonetheless, the present Article
focuses mainly on the litigation of constitutional issues in state and federal courts. See also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36
UCLA L. REV. 233, 238 (1988) ("[Tihe parity debate in the cases and scholarly literature has
centered on constitutional cases."). One empirical study of federal issues litigated in seven
state supreme courts in 1983 found that over ninety percent consisted of federal
constitutional, rather than statutory, issues. Daniel J. Meador, Federal Law in State
Supreme Courts, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 347, 358-59 (1986). Litigant behavior in this regard
would benefit from further empirical study.
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for state law.' The answer is that "an enormous tradition of
federalistic rhetoric," from the framing of the Constitution to
present-day Supreme Court doctrine, supports the "legitimacy and
desirability" of state courts having a significant role in explicating
federal constitutional norms.' To be sure, as Bator immediately
acknowledged, "there is another rhetorical tradition, running
directly to the contrary," 9 which would sharply limit or even
eliminate that role. Bator further conceded that the "conventional
arguments for federalism,"-"the benefits of dispersing powers and
of having multiple laboratories of social experimentation"-seem,
"at first glance, [of] doubtful" applicability to "the proper role of
state judges in deciding issues of federal law."1
In sorting out these problems, Bator first turned to the institutional arrangements that, in theory or in practice, would route some
or all federal issues from state to federal courts. These avenues
would include removing cases from state to federal court; automatically permitting collateral relitigation of state court resolution of
issues in federal court (e.g., through habeas corpus); or permitting
a state court defendant (or prospective defendant) to seek anticipatory relief of the federal issue in federal court." Each of these
devices is permitted, to varying degrees, under current law. Their
current use, however, is severely circumscribed, and for good
reason, according to Bator. The automatic, or even near-automatic,
removal of all civil and criminal proceedings in state courts that
raise federal issues would be "obviously unacceptable," because it
would add a large number of cases to the federal docket and might
hinder cases from being resolved on other grounds.12 Likewise,
automatic collateral relitigation would exact "severe costs," by
both adding many cases to federal dockets and undermining "the
deterrent and rehabilitative functions of the criminal law" through
7. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 2-3 (2d ed. 1990).
8. Bator, supra note 2, at 606.
9. Id. at 607. Richard Fallon has labeled these the Federalist and Nationalist positions,
respectively. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal CourtsLaw, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141 (1988).
10. Bator, supra note 2, at 608.
11. Id. at 610-21.
12. Id. at 611.
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the denial of finality to criminal convictions. 3 Finally, the anticipatory relief model, even one that ostensibly carves out only the
federal issue for federal court resolution, ultimately is "the functional equivalent of removal," and thus shares the infirmities of

removal. 14
None of these arguments demonstrate, Bator said, "that we
should never allow" these three options.'" Instead, all he
tried to show is that there are sufficiently weighty and serious
doubts and disadvantages associated with these devices that it
is extremely unlikely that anything like automatic or unlimited
access to them will, in the foreseeable future, be permitted. Once
we see the context, it is clear that claims favoring a federal
forum will not and should not exact an unconditional surrender.
The federalistic position cannot simply be routed.6
Neither the federal nor state courts should have a "monopoly" on
the "task of defining and enforcing federal constitutional principles.' The question will always be where to draw the line, "but
line-drawing is the correct enterprise."'8
In considering where to draw those lines, Bator considered a
variety of issues regarding parity,'9 to which I will turn in Part I.
He concluded by emphasizing that he was not disparaging "the
historic contribution which the federal courts have made to the task
of transforming constitutional ideals into reality," and he conceded
that "there may be periods when a highly interventionist position
[by federal courts supervising state courts] is necessary and
justified."2 Yet, none of this detracts, he said, from his principle
point that "state courts will and should continue to play a substantial role in the elaboration of federal constitutional principles."2

13. Id. at 614.
14. Id. at 619.
15. Id. at 621.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 622.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 623-35.
20. Id. at 635.
21. Id. at 637.
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In the balance of this Article, I consider how Professor Bator's
analysis has stood up for over two decades, and what it tells us
about the continued study of parity. In Part I, I consider functionalist critiques of parity, the work of law professors and political
scientists who, since Bator's article, have empirically studied parity,
and the strengths and weaknesses of that literature. Part II of the
Article focuses on the prospect of disuniformity in the application
of federal constitutional rights by the large number of state courts,
and problems associated with the ability of the U.S. Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts to monitor that application through the
certiorari and habeas corpus process, respectively. Finally, Part III
addresses how a variety of prospective changes to state court
institutions affect parity. This includes the convergence of civil and
criminal procedure in federal and state courts, and possible reforms
of judicial selection and election processes in state courts.22
I. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF PARITY
As has been frequently remarked, parity has both a constitutional and empirical dimension, which can be regarded as "conceptually distinct."2 3 The former concerns, among other things, how the
framing and text of Article III of the Constitution, and jurisdictional
statutes passed by Congress, does or should impact jurisprudential
doctrine that variously routes cases to federal or state courts. The
latter "asks whether state courts-in fact and on average-are as

22. As with Professor Bator's article, an exhaustive survey of various other issues of
potential relevance to the parity issue is beyond the scope of the present Article. For
example, Bator makes only passing mention of the then-nascent growth of litigation under
stateconstitutional provisions, often seeking to expand personal rights beyond that found by
federal courts under federal constitutional provisions. See id. at 605 n.1. For further
discussion of this phenomenon, focusing particularly on the tension between simultaneously
criticizing the ability of state judges to fairly enforce federal constitutional rights while
extolling state judges' abilities to formulate rights-protecting state constitutional law, see
SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 91-93. See also William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of
Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 622 (1999) (noting "an inherent tension" between
critics of parity and supporters of state constitutional rights, as "it is unlikely that state
courts would simultaneously be sympathetic to state constitutional arguments and

unsympathetic to federal constitutional arguments').
23. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 325 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
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fair and as competent as federal courts. 2 4 The two dimensions are
of course related; one's view of the realistic abilities of state courts
will inevitably color one's normative view of federal courts jurisprudence. Nonetheless, in this Article I focus primarily on the empirical dimension of parity.25
A. The EmpiricalLiterature
As Bator observed in his article, the "best summary of the
functional arguments in favor of federal-court superiority"2 6 is
2"
Professor Burt Neuborne's oft-cited2 7 article, The Myth of Parity.
Writing over a quarter-century ago, Neuborne set the parameters
of the empirical debate. In brief, Neuborne argued that "three sets
of reasons" supported a preference for federal court disposition of
federal rights:
First, the level of technical competence which the federal district
court is likely to bring to the legal issues involved generally will
be superior to that of a given state trial forum. Stated bluntly,
in my experience, federal trial courts tend to be better equipped
to analyze complex, often conflicting lines of authority and more
likely to produce competently written, persuasive opinions than
are state trial courts. Second, there are several factors, unrelated to technical competence-which, lacking a better term, I
call a court's psychological set-that render it more likely that
an individual with a constitutional claim will succeed in federal
24. Id. at 323.
25. Professor Rubenstein further parses the parity debate by breaking down the issues
into ones of forum allocation ("defining the proper role of the federal courts in a federal
system and identifying what courts should hear what issues in what manner"), forum
selection ("helping to describe how lawyers might consider what court system to enter if a
choice between a federal and state forum exists'), and "whether the institutional arguments
for or against parity merely provide a seemingly neutral discourse meant to mask naked
political preferences." Rubenstein, supra note 22, at 603. In this Article, I am concerned
primarily with empirical arguments that underlie, to varying degrees, all three of these
issues.
26. Bator, supra note 2, at 607 n.7.
27. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 35 & n.24 (noting the frequency of citation of
Neuborne's article). Professor Ann Althouse has opined that the article has itself achieved
a "mythic status." Id. (citing Ann Althouse, FederalJurisdictionand the Enforcement of
FederalRights: Can Congress Bring Back the Warren Era?,20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1067,
1071 (1995) (book review)).
28. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
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district court than in a state trial court. Finally, the federal
judiciary's insulation from majoritarian pressures makes federal
court structurally preferable to state trial court as a forum in
which to challenge powerful local interests.2 9
Writing three years after the publication of Neuborne's article,
Bator rightly acknowledged the "splendid statement of the case for
superior federal court competence" by Neuborne.3 ° He expressed
skepticism, nonetheless, of the full breadth of many of Neuborne's
arguments. He argued that "[i]n many cases the proper comparison
is not between the federal courts and the state trial courts, but
between the federal courts and the entire hierarchy of state
courts."3 1 Many state supreme court justices, he continued, are "as
well paid and have as much prestige as federal judges," and it was
his experience that those he had met were "as expert on issues of
federal constitutional laws as are federal judges. 3 2 Although many
state court judges are elected, he felt that at least at the supreme
court level, "terms tend to be long enough to assure that at least the
grosser threats to judicial independence are absent."3 3 As for the
superior "psychological set" of federal judges, Bator argued that the
argument drew too deeply on a "special historical experience," the
lamentable record of some state court judges during the modern
civil rights era.3 4 Moreover, the "elitism of the federal bench, its
distance from much of the daily grind of the administration of
justice, its specialization-all of these are advantages, but they are
disadvantages too."3

29. Id. at 1120-21. My brief summary of Neuborne's article cannot do full justice to the
breadth and depth of his analysis, or to the historical and social science evidence he
marshalls in support. For a fuller discussion of Neuborne's article, see SOLIMINE & WALKER,
supra note 1, at 34-45.
30. Bator, supranote 2, at 623 n.51.
31. Id. at 630.
32. Id. He added that although "the vindication of the federal constitutional right may
be blocked by an incompetent or insensitive state trial judge," in a way that cannot be
remedied on appeal, "once the state appellate system is folded into the consideration of the
argument, claims for a clear federal superiority become greatly attenuated." Id. at 631.
33. Id. at 630. In "many states," he added, "the election of state supreme court judges is
largely a formality." Id. at 630 n.62.
34. Id. at 631.
35. Id. at 634.
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Others have since elaborated on Bator's arguments. For example,
James Walker and I have responded to Neuborne in various ways.
We agreed that much of the modern evidence concerning the failure
of state courts to follow federal law was an "unfortunate aberration"
of the civil rights era.3 6 We also argued, among other things, that
many state courts operate on a more professional basis than before,
and many states have modeled their procedure after federal
practice;3 7 that for the most part state judicial elections are low-key
affairs, with many judges running unopposed and majoritarian
electoral pressure usually playing a minor role;3" and that state
appellate courts can and do adequately monitor rulings on federal
issues by state trial courts.3 9
Still, we acknowledged, as did Bator, that many of these contentions ultimately "rest on human insight rather than on empirical
evidence."4 ° To attempt to study parity more directly, Walker and
I examined a random sample of more than one thousand cases from
U.S. district courts and state appellate courts that: (1) were decided
between 1974 and 1980; and (2) resolved claims under the First
and Fourth Amendments, or the Equal Protection Clause of the
36. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 36; see also JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE
PEOPLE'S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND JUDGES As GUARDIANS OF RIGHTS 124-26
(1998) (discussing hostility or annoyance of some state courts to Warren Court decisions of
the 1950s and 1960s); James A. Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism:Power and
Interpretation in State ConstitutionalLaw, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1780-81 (2003)
(arguing that federal courts "enjoy a favorable reputation as protectors of liberty," in part
because many of the well-known decisions of the Warren Court advancing constitutional
rights were reviews, and reversals, of state court decisions, but further contending that
"[m]uch of this has changed"); cf. Corinna Barrett Lain, CountermajoritarianHero or Zero?
Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the CriminalProcedureRevolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1361, 1371-72 (2004) (arguing that the entire criminal justice system in the South, not
merely state judges, was at fault in the 1950s and early 1960s). For documentation of the
divergence of federal and state courts in protecting constitutional rights in the 1950s and
1960s, see David W. Romero & Francine Sanders Romero, Precedent,Parity, and Racial
Discrimination:A Federal/StateComparisonof the Impact of Brown v. Board of Education,
37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 809, 819 tbl. 1 (2003) (stating that the results of their study of federal
district courts and state supreme courts deciding cases involving challenge to state-sponsored
discrimination before and after 1954 indicated, inter alia, that pro-plaintiff decisions
increased from 38% to 74% in the former and 29% to 31% in the latter).
37. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 37-38; see also infra Part III.A.
38. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 41-42; see also infra Part III.B.
39. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 44-45, 55-58.
40. Bator, supra note 2, at 623; see SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 34 (noting that
debate over parity is often uninformed by empirical evidence).
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Fourteenth Amendment.41 We chose those issues because of their
high-profile nature and the possibility that counter-majoritarian
pressures, of the kind highlighted by critics of parity, would be most
evident in those cases.42 We coded a number of variables for each
case, the most important of which was the outcome, in other words,
whether the claimed federal right was upheld.43 We found that all
of the courts upheld the federal claim in 36% of the cases.44 The
breakdown for all federal and state court cases was 41.7% and
31.4%, respectively.45 We concluded, among other things, that
although litigants had a greater chance of success in federal courts,
there was no evidence of systematic bias in state courts against the
assertion of federal claims, as compared to the litigation of the same
or similar issues in federal courts.4 s
To my knowledge, this study was the first systematic, empirical
examination of parity, in the sense of simultaneously studying
outcomes of the same or similar federal issues in federal and state
courts. There have been a number of additional studies in the past
two decades, several of which I will briefly consider here. 47 Most, if

not all, of the studies focus on the adjudication of a particular issue
of federal law. For example, Brett C. Gerry examined how lower
federal courts and state courts interpreted a U.S. Supreme Court
decision involving the Takings Clause. 48 Gerry found that forty41. Our study was first published as an article, ConstitutionalLitigation in Federaland

State Courts:An EmpiricalAnalysis of JudicialParity,10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983).
It is reprinted, in a substantially rewritten and updated form, in chapter 3 of SOLIMINE &
WALKER, supra note 1. All future references to the study will be to the latter publication.
42. See SOLIMINE &WALKER, supranote 1, at 45. We also observed there that two of the
well-known Supreme Court decisions premised implicitly (Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971)) or explicitly (Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976)) on the existence of some
form of parity concerned the First and Fourth Amendments, respectively. SOLIMINE &
WALKER, supra note 1, at 45.
43. For further details on the methodology of the study, see SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra
note 1, at 45-46.
44. Id. at 47.
45. Id.
46. For further discussion of the results, see id. at 47-51.
47. For overviews of the empirical literature, see DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND
AMERICAN LAW 105-17 (2003); SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 34-42, 54-55; Brett

Christopher Gerry, ParityRevisited: An EmpiricalComparisonof State and Lower Federal
Court Interpretationsof Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 233, 249-52 (1999); Romero & Romero, supra note 36, at 810-13.
48. See Gerry, supra note 47. The case in question was Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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seven reported federal cases and 112 reported state cases applied
the decision, and that courts in both categories applied the decision
in strikingly similar ways. 49 He concluded that the "results provide
strong evidence of parity in the takings area."'
Two studies have focused on gay rights. William Rubenstein
canvassed a variety of cases in federal and state courts that
adjudicated a variety of rights advanced by gays in the last two
decades. 5 He found that state courts had, in at least some circumstances on some issues, become as or more hospitable a forum as
compared to federal courts.5 2 Referencing Neuborne's reasons for
federal court superiority, Rubenstein suggested that state courts
may be more competent on family law matters, where gay rights
often arise;53 that some state judges who "may more regularly
interact professionally with gay people, '5 4 may have a psychological
set favorable, in some ways, toward gay rights claims; and that at
least in certain jurisdictions, gay rights may not be countermajoritarian or a high profile issue in judicial elections.5 5
Daniel Pinello canvassed many of the same issues as the
Rubenstein study, but did so by systematically examining reported decisions from eighty-six federal and 307 state courts in the
last two decades.5 6 Like Rubenstein, he found that state courts
were more hospitable than federal courts to gay rights claims.5"
Specifically, when "adjudicating federal constitutional issues-the
heart of Neuborne's concern-state tribunals resolved lesbian and
gay rights claims 56.3% more positively than federal courts (47.2%

49. See Gerry, supra note 47, at 271-86 (describing methodology and results).
50. Id. at 285.
51. See Rubenstein, supranote 22, at 606-11. Rubenstein's study is empirical in the same
sense as any doctrinal survey. It consists primarily of "anecdotal empirical evidence." Id. at
605. Also, the study "somewhat elide[s] the distinction between federal constitutional claims
and state constitutional claims," so it must be read with caution in addressing the parity
debate in "its purest form." Id. at 621.
52. Id. at 610-11.
53. See id. at 612-13.
54. Id. at 615.
55. Id. at 619-20.
56. See PINELLO, supra note 47, at 109-16 (reporting the findings of the study).
57. Id. at 116.
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versus 30.2%)."8 He found that elected state judges, moreover, were
more favorably disposed to such claims than appointed judges.5 9
Another group of studies examines the adjudication of federal
constitutional issues in state court, without simultaneously
examining how the same issues are treated in federal court.6 ° As
Gerry observed, because "instances of overt state court defiance of
clear Supreme Court mandates are quite uncommon, the results of
...[these] studies often turn[] largely upon" how the study
operationalizes compliance with Supreme Court precedent.6 1 One
recent study examined how state supreme courts applied Supreme
Court precedent regarding the legality of confessions in criminal
cases.6" A similar study examined how state supreme courts
complied with Supreme Court precedent involving search and
seizure.6 3 A final example of this genre are studies of capital cases
in state courts. James Liebman and his colleagues have documented that over half of death sentences handed down in those

58. Id. at 110.
59. Id. at 112-13.
60. This literature is often referenced as judicial impact research in political science
circles, particularly as it pertains to how state courts apply U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
See Gerry, supranote 47, at 253-57 (discussing the literature); Romero & Romero, supranote
36, at 811-12 (same). For more recent examples of this literature, see James N.G. Cauthen
& C. Scott Peters, Courting Constituents:District Elections and Judicial Behavior on the
LouisianaSupreme Court, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 265 (2003) (analyzing the votes in search and
seizure cases of Louisiana Supreme Court justices who are elected by districts); Wayne A.
Logan, "DemocraticDespotism"and ConstitutionalConstraint:An EmpiricalAnalysis of Ex
Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 439 (2004) (analyzing state
court treatment of claims asserted under ex post facto prohibitions).
61. Gerry, supra note 47, at 254.
62. See Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Martinek, State Supreme Court Decision Making in
Confession Cases, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 109 (2002). This study covered a sample of 661 state court
cases from 1970 to 1991 and measured compliance by, among other things, coding the result
of the case (whether the confession was suppressed) and the facts cited by the state case. See
id. at 119-22. The authors concluded, among other things, that Supreme Court precedent is
followed. Id. at 122-23.
63. See Scott A. Comparato & Scott D. McClurg, Ambiguity in the Transmission of
Precedent: A Team Theoretic Approach to the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and
State Supreme Courts (Apr. 3-6, 2003) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Midwest Political Sci. Ass'n, Chi., Ill., available at http://www.siu.edu/-mcclurg/research/
ambiguity-l.pdf. This study examined a sample of 959 state court cases from 1983 to 1995,
id. at 30, and measured compliance by comparing the result of the state court decision with
the result of the Supreme Court case it was purporting to follow. Id. at 13-14. By this
standard, 45% of the cases were non-compliant. Id. at 14.
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courts are overturned, in some manner, by a later reviewing court.64
Related studies have demonstrated that elected state court judges
are more likely to uphold death sentences than their appointed
counterparts.6 5 Because the denial of federal constitutional rights
is often the source of error, some have argued that these results
considerably undermine the concepts of parity.6 6
All of these studies examined court decisions. Another group of
studies directly or indirectly examined parity by surveying the
opinions of lawyers.6 7 These studies generally concluded that
"attorneys, when they have the choice, prefer federal court over
64. See James S. Liebman et al., CapitalAttrition:Error Rates in Capital Cases, 19731995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1853-54 (2000). It is worth noting that the high error rate is due
in part to state appellate courts (rather than only the U.S. Supreme Court on direct review,
or later federal courts considering writs of habeas corpus) identifying errors in state trial
courts. See id. at 1847-48. On this point, see also Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System:
The PersistentPatternsof Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 209, 220 (2004); Barry Latzer & James N.G. Cauthen, Capital Appeals
Revisited, 84 JUDICATURE 64, 66-68 (2000). Larry Yackle presents a different perspective on
the Liebman study. It is true, he says,
that state courts frequently identify constitutional errors in their own
proceedings and correct those mistakes themselves, obviating any need for
prisoners to petition the federal courts. During the period from 1973 to 1995,
state courts found serious errors in 47 percent of the cases in which death
sentences had been imposed at the trial level. Yet all too often state courts
overlook violations of prisoners' federal rights. During the same period, 1973 to
1995, federal courts found serious errors in 40 percent of the remainingcases,
that is, the cases in which state courts had previously affirmed convictions and
death sentences.
Larry W. Yackle, Capital Punishment, Federal Courts, and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, in
BEYOND REPAIR?: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 58, 60 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
65. See, e.g., Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case
Facts, Context, and Rules in the Politicsof Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206, 1221-22 (1997);
Gelman et al., supra note 64, at 230-31. For further discussion of this literature, see
SOLIMINE & WALKER, supranote 1, at 118-19.
66. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full
Habeas Corpus Review by Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting
ConstitutionalRights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1808-09 (2000); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J.
Keenan, Judges and the Politicsof Death: DecidingBetween the Bill of Rights and the Next
Election in CapitalCases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 760 (1995).
67. See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales for Federal Question Jurisdiction:An
EmpiricalExaminationof Student Rights Litigation, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1315 (surveying 267
attorneys involved in student rights cases); Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum
Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and FederalQuestion Jurisdiction,41 AM. U. L.

REV. 369 (1992) (surveying 482 attorneys in cases removed from state to federal court). For
an excellent review and summary of the literature, see Victor E. Flango, Litigant Choice
Between State and FederalCourts, 46 S.C. L. REV. 961 (1995).

2005]

THE FUTURE OF PARITY

1469

state court" when litigating federal constitutional rights.6" Even on
their own terms, however, these studies do not report overwhelming
preferences for federal court, and reveal that the preference is often
contingent on a host of case-specific factors.69
B. Critiquingthe Literature
Recognizing that none of the empirical literature on parity is, or
purports to be, even remotely definitive, I have previously suggested that this demonstrates that state courts, on the whole, are
not systematically underenforcing federal constitutional rights,
and, with inevitable exceptions, are capable of fairly adjudicating
those rights.7 ° Yet, even that assertion of "weak parity," with its
many qualifications and contingencies, has not gone unchallenged.
The most trenchant criticism has been by Erwin Chemerinsky.
First writing on this point in 1988, he advanced a series of arguments that, in his view, seriously undermine the utility of empirical
literature.
In particular, Chemerinsky argued that establishing standards
for comparisons is difficult.7 1 Simply because one court upholds an
asserted federal constitutional right, and another denies it, does not
necessarily mean that the latter is not "properly" adjudicating the

68. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 69. Surveying this literature, James Gardner
argued that changes in state court receptiveness to enforcing rights under federal and state
law "seem very far from having penetrated public consciousness." Gardner, supra note 36,
at 1783. He continued:
If actual litigation decisions are any guide, state courts today appear to be less

trusted than federal courts when it comes to the protection of individual rights.
Although evidence is difficult to come by, it appears that litigants, given a
choice between suing in state and federal court, prefer to bring civil rights
claims in a federal forum. Even when they proceed in a state court, litigants
tend overwhelmingly to raise civil rights claims under the United States
Constitution rather than under their state constitution, suggesting that they
have more faith in the body of constitutional law developed by federal courts
than in the similar body of law developed by state courts construing state
constitutions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
69. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
119, 144 & n.124 (2003) (surveying this literature and finding that the results are "mixed').
70. See SOLIMINE & WALKER, supranote 1, at 42, 47-48, 55, 58-59.
71. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 256-61.
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right.7 2 Constitutional cases "often involve balancing government
interests against individual liberties," and it is arguably "wrong to
presuppose that decisions in favor of the latter are preferable. 73
Quality in this context, then, has inherently subjective components
that make objective measurement difficult.
Chemerinsky also examined my and Walker's study in some
detail.7 4 In that regard, he asserted, among other things, that
Walker and I ignored dispositions by state trial courts by focusing
on state appellate courts;7" did not account for the variation in
factual and legal issues in the types of cases we examined; 76 and
provided data in the aggregate that might hide regional and other
differences that could undermine our general support of parity. 77 He
was no less critical of other empirical studies of parity. For
example, the surveys of lawyers "only demonstrate what attorneys
think about parity," not what federal and state courts are actually
doing. 78 For these and other reasons, Chemerinsky concluded that
efforts to empirically "prove" parity are doomed.7 9
Many have echoed Chemerinsky's criticisms. For example, Bator
and others agree that correctness or quality of decision in the
respective fora is a slippery concept to study.'0 As Bator put it:
We should note that the semantic repertoire of our constitutional law-we tend to speak of constitutional "claims" and
"rights" rather than constitutional "principles" or "rules"-subtly
72. See id. at 257-58.
73. Id. at 258.
74. See id. at 261-69.
75. Id. at 263, 267-68.
76. Id. at 263-64.
77. Id. at 266. For a detailed response to some of these criticisms, see SOLIMINE &
WALKER, supra note 1, at 51-55.
78. Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 269.
79. See id. at 273; see also REDISH, supranote 7, at 3 (elaborating on this point); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Ending the ParityDebate, 71 B.U. L. REv. 593 (1991) (same).
80. See Bator, supra note 2, at 631-33; Gerry, supra note 47, at 251-52 (criticizing
Neuborne's position in part due to Neuborne's assumption that "a'good' decision [is] ... one
that rules in favor of an individual advancing a constitutional claim against the
government"); see also Scott D. McClurg & Scott A. Comparato, Rebellious or Just
Misunderstood? Assessing Measures of Lower Court Compliance with U.S. Supreme Court
Precedent (Aug. 28-Sept. 1,2003) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Am. Political
Sci. Ass'n, Phila., Pa. (analyzing various measures of compliance by federal and state courts
with Supreme Court decisions), availableat http://www.siu.edu/-mcclurg/researclrebel.pdf.
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suggests that when a constitutional question arises, constitutional values are represented only by one side or another. One
party is said to seek the vindication of the Constitution; the
other must therefore be seeking to defeat or subvert it. But the
reality is more complex. Even in the sphere of individual rights,
it is misleading to suppose that the rejection of a particular
constitutional claim imports less fidelity to constitutional values
than its vindication. It was Holmes who reminded us that the
limits contemplated for the coverage of a statute are as significant a part of its purpose as is its affirmative thrust. When a
court upholds a state criminal statute against the claim that it
violates the first amendment, it is rejecting one sort of constitutional claim, but it is also upholding principles of separation of
powers and federalism which themselves have constitutional
status. And, increasingly, cases no longer even present clean-cut
confrontations between "individual" and "governmental" interests. (Which side represents "the individual" in a case involving
the validity of affirmative action?)s"
Others have gone so far as to assert that the empirical literature
on parity is characterized by "rudimentary" statistical methods, as
regression and other sophisticated forms of analysis are generally
not used to test the effect of "potentially consequential independent
variables." 2 More generally, it is difficult, on the one hand, to draw
broad conclusions on parity from a study of one type of case. On the
other hand, the utility of a broader study, like that conducted by
Walker and me, has its own problems, not the least of which is that
we cannot hold constant all variables to attempt to parse out the
sole influence of different fora litigating the "same" legal issue. 3
In short, many of the criticisms of Chemerinsky and others are
well founded in varying degrees. In my view, however, it does not
follow that the extant studies are in essence flawed, or that further
research should not be conducted. 4 It means only that those studies
should be used with caution,8 5 and much more empirical work on
81. Bator, supra note 2, at 632-33.
82. PINELLO, supra note 47, at 107.
83. See SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 43 (acknowledging this problem, but
positing that it can be dealt with, in part, by sampling a large number of cases).
84. For a similar conclusion by a self-described skeptic of parity, see Susan N. Herman,
Comment, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651, 662 (1991).
85. For a discussion of the rigor and usefulness (or lack thereof) of empirical research
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parity could be done. A short list of further avenues in research
would include examining in greater detail: (1) decisions of trial
courts in federal and state systems; (2) unpublished dispositions in
both systems; (3) familiarity and compliance with U.S. Supreme
Court decisions by lawyers and judges; (4) the effect of judicial
elections on the adjudication of federal rights in state courts; (5) the
quality of advocacy of federal law in state court cases; and (6) the
rate at which cases with federal legal issues are appealed within
state court systems.8

II.

(DIS)UNIFORMITY IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURT ADJUDICATION
OF FEDERAL RIGHTS

As the Supreme Court has recognized from an early time,8 7 it is
common ground in Supreme Court doctrine that federal and state
courts should strive toward uniform application of federal constitutional rights. Likewise, it appears undisputed that the Court has
the responsibility to ensure uniformity by reviewing state court

conducted and published by law professors (as opposed to that by social scientists, typically
published in peer-reviewed journals), see Colloquium, Exchange: EmpiricalResearchand the
Goals of Legal Scholarship,69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).
86. Recently created databases of cases should help facilitate at least some further
research in this area. See, e.g., Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Comparing Courts Using
the American States, 83 JUDICATURE 250 (2000) (describing database of state supreme court
decisions); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 125-29 (2002) (describing database of federal court decisions); Theodore Eisenberg
& Kevin M. Clermont, Courts in Cyperspace, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 94 (1996) (same).
87. In the "supremely important case," CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS 46 (6th ed. 2002), of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816), the Supreme Court held that it possessed power to review federal issues decided by
state courts. See id. at 342-52. In the course of that decision, the Court emphasized the need
for uniformity in the judicial exposition of federal law. See id. at 347-48. Without the Court's

jurisdiction to review state court resolution of federal law,
[jiudges of equal learning and integrity, in different states, might differently
interpret a statute, or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitution
itself: If there were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant
judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the
constitution of the United States would be different in different states.... The
public mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly
deplorable; and it cannot be believed that they could have escaped the
enlightened convention which formed the constitution.
Id. at 348.
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decisions on federal law.8" Professor Bator agreed with these
propositions. As already noted, Bator conceded the desirability of
federal and state courts achieving uniformity in the application of
federal law. 9 Likewise, he intended "to cast no doubt on the need
for federal appellate review of state court judgments on questions
of federal law," in order to provide "uniform and authoritative
pronouncements of federal law."9° In this Part, I examine whether
federal courts possess the institutional capacity to monitor the
development of federal law in state courts and, in turn, whether
absolute uniformity of federal law is possible or even desirable in all
circumstances.
A. Federal Court Monitoring of State Courts
By any measure, the vast majority of particular adjudications of
federal constitutional rights take place in state courts, with most of
those found when one or more of the protections in the Bill of Rights
are at issue in state criminal proceedings. 9 In an article published
in 1990, shortly after his death, Bator estimated that "more than
20,000 cases" per year in state courts turned "on a decisive issue of
federal law."9" In theory, an appreciable number of those could be
88. Compare Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 & n.14 (1986)
(accepting propositions that uniform application of federal law among federal and state
courts is desirable and that the Supreme Court has a role to play in assuring that
uniformity), with id. at 827 & n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with these propositions,
but expressing skepticism that the Supreme Court alone can play such a monitoring role).
Merrell Dow involved an issue of federal statutory, not constitutional, law, but its
institutional analysis seems applicable to both.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
90. Bator, supra note 2, at 635.
91. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042-43 n.8 (1983) (noting that the "vast bulk"
of criminal litigation takes place in state courts); ROBERT A. CARP ET AL., JUDICIAL PROCESS
IN AMERICA 52, 70 (6th ed. 2004) (reporting that as of 2000, about 62,000 criminal cases were
commenced in U.S. district courts, while 4.9 million criminal cases were filed in state courts
of general jurisdiction); cf. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's
DisappearingShadow, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2548, 2554-56 (2004) (discussing complicated
relationships among rising criminal caseloads in state courts, apparently decreasing crime
rates, and the constraints time and money place on prosecutors).
92. Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 679
(1990). He did not specifically say how he so estimated. Perhaps it was derived in some way
from the 300,000 cases in the U.S. district courts, plus the 33,000 cases in the U.S. courts of
appeals, that he reported. See id. at 678-79. At any rate, the 20,000 figure seems within the
ballpark of the actual number.
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reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court, should the parties to those
cases appeal them up through the entire state court systemthough they would always remain a small percentage of the total.
The Supreme Court is busy enough reviewing cases raising
federal issues from the federal courts. Does it also have the capacity
to review systematically such cases from the state courts? Writing
two decades ago, Bator was not sanguine. "Serious questions can,"
he wrote, "be raised about whether the appellate jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court constitutes sufficient appellate
capacity to perform this function,"9" but he did not elaborate on the
point. Five years after that, Justice William Brennan was also
pessimistic about the Supreme Court's institutional capacity to
review state court decisions:
One might argue that this Court's appellate jurisdiction over
state-court judgments in cases arising under federal law can be
depended upon to correct erroneous state-court decisions and to
insure that federal law is interpreted and applied uniformly....
[However], having served on this Court for [thirty] years, it is
clear to me that, realistically, it cannot even come close to "doing
the whole job" ....
The Supreme Court's most recent Terms might seem to belie this
pessimism. With Lawrence v. Texas95 striking down the Texas antisodomy statute as the most notable example, the Court in the 2002
Term reviewed at least ten decisions from state courts raising
important issues of federal constitutional law.9 6 Similarly, in the
93. Bator, supra note 2, at 635-36.
94. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
95. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
96. See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) (upholding Ex Post Facto Clause
challenge to state statute extending criminal statute of limitations for sex-related child abuse
offenses); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
trespass conviction in low-income housing development); Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n, 539 U.S.
103 (2003) (challenging state taxation of gambling under Equal Protection Clause); Illinois
ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003) (asserting that First
Amendment did not preclude civil fraud action against fundraising corporation); Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003) (rejecting Full Faith and Credit Clause challenge to
suit against state agencies immunized by statute in courts of another state); Jinks v.
Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d));
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (declaring Due Process
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2003 Term, the Court in Blakely v. Washington,97 reviewing a
decision of the Washington Supreme Court, invalidated the State
of Washington's criminal sentencing scheme.9" The Court's ruling
threw into doubt the validity of the federal sentencing guidelines
and also those of many states.99 The Court also decided several
other significant cases on review from state courts, all concerning
the rights of defendants in criminal cases.100 One might come away
from these Terms with the impression that the Supreme Court is
performing admirably in its review of federal constitutional
lawmaking by state courts. Such an impression would be misleading, for the 2002 and 2003 Terms continued two trends that support
the laments of Bator and Brennan: a historically low total number
of (1) cases reviewed on the merits and (2) cases reviewed from
state courts.
When Bator and Brennan were writing, the Supreme Court was
reviewing about 130 cases on the merits each Term, with about onefourth of those cases consisting of appeals from state courts.' 0 ' They
Clause limits on awards of punitive damages); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)
(upholding First Amendment challenge to statute banning cross burning); Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding California's "three-strikes" law); Pierce County v.
Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003) (affirming constitutionality of federal statute regulating
discovery in state courts); see also Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) (per curiam)
(dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in highly-watched commercial speech
case).
97. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
98. Id. at 2538.
99. See id. at 2550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Over 20 years of sentencing reform are all
but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments are in jeopardy."); Linda Greenhouse,
Justices, in Bitter 5-4 Vote Split, Raise Doubts on Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, June
25, 2004, at Al.
100. See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004) (defining scope of protections of
Miranda warnings); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004)
(Fourth Amendment and failure to identify oneself to police); Iowa v. Tovar, 124 S. Ct. 1379
(2004) (Sixth Amendment and propriety of guilty plea); Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct.
1354 (2004) (clarifying earlier case concerning the Confrontation Clause); Illinois v. Fisher,
124 S. Ct. 1200 (2004) (Due Process Clause and destruction of evidence sought by defendant);
Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004) (Fourth Amendment and highway checkpoints);
Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003) (Fourth Amendment and search of car
passengers); see alsoJohnson v. California, 124 S. Ct. 1833 (2004) (dismissing case involving
alleged racial use of peremptory jury challenge for lack of jurisdiction).
101. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
DEVELOPMENTS 76 (3d ed. 2003) (compiling data from the Terms of the Court in the 1980s);
Michael E. Solimine, Supreme CourtMonitoringof State Courts in the Twenty-First Century,
35 IND. L. REV. 335, 352-53 (2002) (documenting review of state court decisions in 1980s).

1476

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1457

were concerned about the availability of Supreme Court review
even then. Yet, those numbers inexorably declined, as the
Rehnquist Court began accepting fewer cases for review. In the past
ten Terms, only about eighty cases per Term have been decided on
the merits, and only about twelve of those on average have been
appeals from state courts. °2 The 2002 and 2003 Terms essentially
followed this trend. 10 3
We should be concerned, but not unduly so, by the Court's
shrunken docket insofar as it impacts parity. One useful metaphor
to frame the hierarchal court relationship is that of principal and
agent. 10 4 The Supreme Court is the principal, monitoring the
activities of its agents, the state courts. Yet, simply because not
every case is reviewed, or even reviewable,"0 5 does not mean that
the agents are shirking their obligation under the Supremacy
102. EPSTEIN ETAL., supra note 101, at 75-76 (compiling data from 1926 to 2001 Terms);
Solimine, supra note 101, at 352-55 (compiling and analyzing data from 1989 through 1999
Terms). Various explanations have been offered for the decline of the number of cases
decided on the merits by the Court, including the almost total elimination of the Court's
mandatory appellate jurisdiction; the change of Court personnel; changes in the ideological
makeup of the judges on the lower federal courts; and fewer appeals being pursued by the
federal government. For further discussion of those and other reasons, see Margaret
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's PlenaryDocket, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 737 (2001); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court,
1996 Sup. CT. REV. 403; Philip Allen Lacovara, The Incredible Shrinking Court,AM. LAW.,
Dec. 2003, at 53.
103. See The Supreme Court, 2003 Term, The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497,506 (2004)
(summarizing data from the 2003 Term, in which the Court decided seventy-eight cases on
the merits, with eight of those originating in state courts); The Supreme Court, 2002 Term,
The Statistics, 117 HARV. L. REV. 480, 488-89 (2003) (summarizing data from 2002 Term, in
which the Court decided seventy-eight cases on the merits, with twenty-one of those
originating in state courts).
104. See Solimine, supra note 101, at 355-58 (developing this model). There is political
science literature developing this model, from which I drew, particularly Donald R. Songer
et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-AgentModel of Supreme Court-Circuit
CourtInteractions,38 AM. J. POL. Scl. 673 (1994) (applying model to U.S. courts of appeals
decisions on the Fourth Amendment); see also Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine,
Supreme Court Monitoringof the United States Courtsof Appeals En Banc, 9 SuP. CT. ECON.
REV. 171 (2001) (applying model to Supreme Court review of en banc decisions of the U.S.
courts of appeals); Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System: A
Principal-AgentPerspective,47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 819 (2003) (providing general overview of
model for federal courts).
105. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 1219 ("Although there are those throughout history
who have claimed that Supreme Court review is adequate to address federal interests, at
present no one plausibly can argue that Supreme Court review standingalone is enough.")
(footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
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Clause to follow federal law. If state courts were wildly misconstruing or ignoring federal law, we would expect high rates of reversal
of such decisions in the Court, or other evidence that considerably
undermined the notion of parity. This is not the case. 1 6 That is to
say, state judges, who surely realize that the chance that any
particular decision will be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court is
quite small, nevertheless, on the whole, still follow constitutional
doctrine announced by the Court. By the same token, the paucity of
Supreme Court review places considerable pressure on the presumed existence of some form of parity.'
Perhaps future Courts will increase the size of the docket, if only
periodically. It seems, however, that such changes will not make
much difference.0 8 Even during the Warren Court Era, when about
150 cases were being decided each Term, only a small fraction of
state court (and federal court, for that matter) cases were being
reviewed by the Court. It speaks well of lower court judges, both
federal and state, that they generally follow federal law, to the
extent that compliance can be measured, even when the prospect of
Supreme Court review is low. 10 9 Anecdotal evidence suggests,
106. Solimine, supra note 101, at 354-58; see also supra Part I.A.
107. See Friedman, supranote 5, at 1220; see also Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman,
ReconsideringJudicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 9, 20-21 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002)
(hypothesizing that "both a strong tradition of binding authority and a hierarchical structure
providing more than one opportunity for review can act as powerful checks on decisional
independence" by judges, but suggesting that political scientists have not fully explored this
issue with respect to lower courts).
108. Henry Hart recognized over 40 years ago:
Does a nation of 165 millionf realize any significant gain merely because its
highest judicial tribunal succeeds in deciding 127 cases by full opinion instead
of 117? 137 cases? 147 cases? Or even 157 cases? The hard fact must be faced
that the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States can at best put
their full minds to no more than a tiny handful of the trouble cases which year
by year are tossed up to them out of the great sea of millions and even billions
of concrete situations to which their opinions relate. When this fact is fully
apprehended, it will be seen that the question whether this handful includes or
excludes a dozen or so more cases is unimportant. It will be seen that what
matters about Supreme Court opinions is not their quantity but their quality.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 96 (1959).
109. Solimine, supra note 101, at 358; see also David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fearof
Reversal as an Explanationof Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 579 (2003)
(conducting a study of a sample of search and seizure decisions by U.S. courts of appeals
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moreover, that important cases in state courts involving federal
constitutional law will work their way up the appellate ladder, and
possibly be reviewed by the Supreme Court. There is considerable
evidence that the Court relies, at least in part, on various cues
in deciding which cases to review, including identified conflicts
between federal and state court decisions, and amicus briefs filed
by the federal government, the states, or interest groups.' 10 In this
way, the Supreme Court can be aided in its monitoring function."'
Even in an era of a shrunken docket, it is no stretch for Arthur
Hellman to conclude that: "From the earliest days of the nation's
history, no function of the Court has ranked higher than the
protection of federal rights from hostility or misunderstanding on
the part of state courts. We would not expect the Court to break
with that tradition, and it has not.""' 2
Federal habeas corpus review of criminal convictions in state
court provides another possible avenue of monitoring of the
application of federal constitutional law in state courts. Bator
between 1961 and 1990, which concluded, inter alia, that fear of review and reversal by the
Supreme Court did not account for widespread compliance with Court doctrine); McNollgast,
Politics and the Courts:A Positive Theory of JudicialDoctrineand the Rule of Law, 68 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1631, 1641-47 (1995) (discussing how the Supreme Court can use relatively few
cases decided on the merits to monitor compliance with doctrine by lower courts); Donald R.
Songer et al., Do Judges Follow the Law When There Is No Fearof Reversal?, 24 JUST. SYS.
J. 137 (2003) (answering the title's question "yes" in a study of decision making by federal
courts of appeals judges in diversity cases that are almost never reviewed by the Supreme
Court).
110. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 109-17 (7th ed. 2001).
111. Solimine, supranote 101, at 359. Although extended discussion of state constitutional
law developments is beyond the scope of the present Article, see supra note 22, the possible
effect of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), is worth mentioning. That case
controversially established a presumption in favor of the Supreme Court being able to review
a state court case that apparently relies on both federal and state constitutional law, when
the state case does not clearly indicate that state law compels the decision. Id. at 1040-41.
I have elsewhere argued that Michigan v. Long does not improperly disrupt state judicial
making or inappropriately aggregate power to the Supreme Court. See Solimine, supranote
101, at 340-44; see also Robert M. Howard et al., Ideology, Constraint and the Elimination
of Supreme Court Review: Examining State Court Use of Adequate and Independent State
Grounds 22 (Apr. 3-6, 2003) (paper presented at Annual National Conference of the Midwest
Political Sci. Ass'n, Chi., Ill. (on file with author) (concerning empirical study of state
supreme courts, which concluded that Michigan v. Long has "had little effect" on the
expansion of state constitutional law). For further discussion of the application of Michigan
v. Long in the Supreme Court, see Michael Esler, Michigan v. Long: A Twenty Year
Retrospective, 66 ALB. L. REV. 835 (2003).
112. Hellman, supra note 102, at 428 (footnote omitted).
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considered the point in his article. Why, he asked, "can't federal
habeas corpus simply be characterized as an alternate form of
federal appellate review, justified precisely because direct Supreme
Court review of state court judgments does not provide sufficient
appellate capacity?"' 13 He proceeded to argue that the analogy fails.
For one thing, in pure appellate review, the U.S. Supreme Court is
the reviewing body, while in habeas, a single U.S. district judge is,
in effect, superintending the state court system." 4 Federal district
courts, moreover, cannot be expected to achieve uniformity of
federal law by themselves, even taking into account review of their
habeas decisions by the U.S. courts of appeals and, possibly, the
U.S. Supreme Court." 5 Bator acknowledged that he was neither
making a "sharp logical distinction between federal appellate
review and federal collateral relitigation," nor "asserting that it
[was] ... inconceivable for the federal district courts to play a role in
the appellate supervision of state courts adjudicating federal
questions."' 6 Yet, he concluded that habeas review was simply not
a substitute for direct review by the Supreme Court. 7
In my view, Bator gets this mostly right. Even in theory, habeas
review will at best play a marginal role in monitoring state courts.
It applies only to state criminal litigation-though that is usually
more important than civil litigation, as one's life or liberty cannot
be deprived by the latter. Although over 20,000 habeas petitions
have been filed annually in U.S. district courts in recent years, that
amounts to a tiny percentage (1.71%) of persons incarcerated in
state prisons." 8 Federal courts, moreover, rarely grant such
petitions (about 1-4% in any given year).' 9 On important issues,
113. Bator, supra note 2, at 636 n.68.

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. HART&WECHSLER, supranote 23, at 1312 (noting data from 2000); see also SOLIMINE
& WALKER, supra note 1, at 122-23.
119. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 23, at 1313. The very low rate of grants of habeas
petitions can be interpreted as an endorsement of parity. E.g., SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra
note 1, at 123. No doubt, however, it is also a function of the increasing restrictions placed
on the power of federal judges to grant habeas petitions, culminating in the passage of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1224 (1996) (codified mainly at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254, 2261-2266). The relative
scarcity of the filing and granting of habeas petitions might suggest that federal courts
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however, habeas has proven to play a role. For example, many
errors of federal constitutional law in state capital cases have been
uncovered through habeas relief. 2 ° That role may or may not
continue, depending on the success of campaigns to limit or
eliminate capital punishment in the states. Then, too, other issues
played out in state criminal proceedings (e.g., DNA testing, war on
terrorism measures, etc.) may provide an appropriate opportunity
for more active federal habeas relief in the future."'

should pay more, not less, attention to those cases. For a brief discussion of the impact of the
AEDPA, see SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 121-22. For much more extensive
discussion of the AEDPA and of other recent developments in federal habeas corpus, see
HART & WECHSLER, supranote 23, at 1296-1399; and LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS:
HABEAS CORPUS (2003).
120. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 23, at 1300-01; Yackle, supra note 64, at 59-60;
Gelman et al., supra note 64, at 215-16, 249-52.
121. See SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 124-27 (acknowledging pros and cons of
federal habeas review but supporting its continued existence for several reasons, including
as a necessary supplement to direct Supreme Court review); Barry Friedman, Habeas and
Hubris,45 VAND. L. REv. 797, 819-20 (1992) (supporting habeas review based on, inter alia,
a dynamic view of the ebb and flow of perceptions of parity and the rise and fall of the
salience of legal issues presented in habeas cases); Kermit Roosevelt III, Light from Dead
Stars: The ProceduralAdequate and Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM.
L. REv. 1888, 1916 (2003) ("[The possibility of direct Supreme Court review is so vanishingly
slight that the responsibility must be allocated elsewhere, if the idea of federal supervision
of state judicial systems is not to become pure fiction.").
To be sure, to fully equate direct review with habeas review, one could expand the ambit
of the latter, as various commentators have advocated. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Tale of
Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REv. 247,253-55 (1988); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?:
The AnachronisticAttack on Habeas Corpus/DirectReview Parity,92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997,
2009-10 (1992); Catherine T. Struve, Direct and CollateralFederal Court Review of the
Adequacy of State ProceduralRules, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 243, 302-04 (2003). Yet, especially
in light of the AEDPA, habeas review is now considerably narrower than direct review, and
probably will remain that way. Notably, Bator was an advocate of a narrower role for habeas.
See Bator, supranote 3. Even Bator, however, did not assert that habeas has no role to play
in monitoring state courts. For excellent overviews of various models of habeas, see Brian
M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of Habeas Corpus, 49
DUKE L.J. 947,983-1003 (2000); Ann Woolhandler, DemodelingHabeas,45 STAN. L. REV. 575,
582-87 (1993). Hoffstadt persuasively argues that current habeas doctrine is best
characterized as an "appellate model," as "many aspects of federal habeas review make it
look like a final layer in a single process of appellate review that begins in state court after
a conviction is handed down and ends with federal habeas." Hoffstadt, supra,at 993-94; see
also J. Richard Broughton, Habeas Corpus and the Safeguards of Federalism,2 GEO. J. L. &
PUB. POLVY 109, 154-67 (2004) (defending current habeas regime as respectful of state
interests and indicative of a shared responsibility between Congress and the federal courts
in shaping habeas doctrine).
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B. DisuniformApplication of Federal Rights
Even if state courts did not adjudicate issues of federal law (or
did not exist at all), there would still be the potential for lack of
uniformity in federal law. The Supreme Court does not decide every
case, and out of necessity the lower federal courts are charged with
applying federal law. Some disuniformity is inevitable. The
situation is only exacerbated by adding state courts to the mix,
which adds to the total number of cases involving judges who lack
Article III protections and are not considered experts in federal law.
Federal law, virtually by definition it would seem, should in
theory be uniform throughout the country.122 Bator recognized the
problem of reconciling that principle with federalism. Decentralized
authority and other virtues of federalism do not advance the project
of applying uniform, federal law.' 23 Later on, though, he suggested
a different tack:
You may remember that at the outset of this lecture I said that
conventional federalistic arguments relating to "decentralization" seem inapposite to this issue. But I now ask for your
second thoughts. Are they not in fact highly relevant? Do we not
derive enormous benefits from having a variety of institutional
"sets" within which issues of federal constitutional law are
addressed? The creative ferment of experimentation which
federalism encourages is not irrelevant to the task of constitu-

tional adjudication. And, given this context, it becomes clear
that many of the arguments made in favor of the federal forum
are, precisely, arguments in favor of partnership, not arguments
for a federal monopoly.'2 4
122. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation,110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997) (arguing that there should be only one
authoritative interpretation of the Constitution). In making this point, I acknowledge but
take no position regarding the ongoing debate as to whether the Supreme Court is or should
be the sole authoritative expositor of federal constitutional law. For an overview of that
debate, see LARRYD. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Barry Friedman, Mediated PopularConstitutionalism,101 MICH.
L. REV. 2596 (2003).
123. See supratext accompanying note 10.
124. Bator, supranote 2, at 634. Interestingly, writing a few years later, Bator appears
to have tracked back to his initially articulated position. In a review of RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985), Bator quoted Posner as saying that "the
proposition that federal law ought to be the same everywhere in the country is not
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So, was Bator correct? Is disuniform federal law an oxymoron?
In answering these questions, it is first worth observing that, for
various reasons, there are many examples of nonuniform federal
law. Consider the First Amendment status of obscenity. The
Supreme Court has held that obscene material enjoys no protection
under the Amendment, and that each community is entitled to
decide for itself what is obscene, based on its own standards.'2 5 The
Court has specifically recognized the nonuniform nature of this
aspect of federal law:
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas,
or New York City. People in different States vary in their tastes
and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the
absolutism of imposed uniformity.12

Obscenity regulation presents the unusual situation of nonuniformity being formally entrenched in federal law. Yet, there are
many other examples of ostensibly uniform federal law being
persuasive. If uniformity is desirable (as it is), so is [sic] diversity and competition." Paul M.
Bator, The JudicialUniverse of Judge Richard A. Posner, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1146, 1154-55
(1985) (book review) (quoting POSNER, supra,at 163). Bator found
these remarks baffling. If we want "diversity and competition" with respect to
a given field of law, our federal system provides an easy and intelligible way to
obtain them: we should leave the question to state law. But it is incoherent and
unjust to say that questions of tax and antitrust and social security should be
governed by federal law but that that federal law should have different
meanings in different circuits.
Id. at 1155. Both Posner and Bator, however, were primarily addressing the narrower point
of federal legal issues "percolating" through the U.S. courts of appeals prior to resolution by
the Supreme Court. Bator was no fan of percolation. See infra note 136.
125. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973). For an excellent discussion of
regulation of obscenity as an example of nonuniform federal law, see Mark D. Rosen, The
Radical Possibilityof Limited Community-Based Interpretationof the Constitution,43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 927, 995-97 (2002).

126. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32-33 (citations and footnotes omitted). The Court also observed:
The use of "national" standards, however, necessarily implies that materials
found tolerable in some places, but not under the "national" criteria, will
nevertheless be unavailable where they are acceptable. Thus, in terms of
danger to free expression, the potential for suppression seems at least as great
in the application of a single nationwide standard as in allowing distribution in
accordance with local tastes ....
Id. at 32 n.13.
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applied in a nonuniform way. Many federal constitutional rights
are, of course, often framed at a high level of generality so that their
application by federal and state judges is nonuniform, in the sense
of turning heavily on the facts and circumstances of a particular
case.'2 7 Perhaps many or most federal constitutional rights could be
so characterized. As James Gardner has pointed out, "the fact that
some right or liberty may be constitutionally guaranteed does not,
in our system, affirmatively grant anyone the right to engage in any
particular behavior."' 2 8 The broad articulation of a negative right,
that all levels of government cannot suppress, is typically uniform
throughout the country.' 29 In contrast, if the Court issues "a stingy
ruling on individual rights," 3 ° it is up to various states and
localities to determine whether to take steps to regulate the conduct
in question.' 3 ' Even narrowly focused federal rights often have
nonuniform application, simply by virtue of various federal district
courts, and federal appellate courts (not to mention state courts),
coming to different conclusions on the same issue. Circuit splits on
federal law are not an uncommon phenomenon, and not all such
splits are advanced to, much less resolved by, the Supreme Court. 3' 2
127. To illustrate this point by simple example: some federal rights are relatively clear-cut
rules (e.g., the First Amendment right to burn flags, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989)), and one would expect relatively little litigation regarding that right, and little
opportunity for nonuniform application in the United States. On the other hand, many rights
are standard-like, and their identification and vindication depend heavily on the facts and
circumstances of particular cases. Consider, for example, the right to attend a racially
desegregated public school. See Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School
Desegregation,and Federalism,45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691 (2004) (discussing the Supreme
Court's delegation of implementation of school desegregation mandates to lower federal
courts, and the fact that implementation often turns on, and gives considerable deference to,
local conditions).
128. James A. Gardner, State ConstitutionalRights as Resistance to National Power:
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1044 (2003).
129. See Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 890-91 (1989).
130. Gardner, supra note 128, at 1044.
131. See id. at 1044-48.
132. See LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS
HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 101 (2001); see also Arthur D.
Hellman, By PrecedentUnbound: The Natureand Extent of UnresolvedIntercircuitConflicts,
56 U. PITT. L. REV. 693 (1995) (study of unresolved circuit conflicts, finding that disruption
and uncertainty generated by such conflicts is often less than commonly assumed); Arthur
D. Hellman, Light on a DarklingPlain:IntercircuitConflicts in the Perspective of Time and
Experience, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 247 (same); Arthur D. Hellman, Never the Same River Twice:
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This lack of uniformity resonates, at least to some extent, with
the functional values of federalism. Those values are said to be,
among other things, permitting states in a federation to protect
liberty by checking the authority of the national government;
making it more likely that the diverse interests of various subgroups in a geographically large nation will be better recognized
and served by smaller governmental units; and allowing states to
serve as "laboratories of experimentation" on various issues, which
can benefit other, observant states and the federal government,
should they decide to act as well. 1 33 Nonuniform federal law as such
would not seemingly serve the first interest, 3 4 but it could advance
the second or third. Given the wide diversity of views on various
issues throughout the nation, some disparity in federal law can be
tolerable or even welcome. 131 Similarly, disparate rulings on federal
law may permit an issue to percolate in federal and state courts,
resolution of the issue, if
which may benefit the Supreme Court's
136
and when it chooses to resolve it.
The Empirics and Epistemology of Intercircuit Conflicts, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 81 (2001)
(discussing the extent and significance of intercircuit conflicts, and discussing how and to
what extent the Supreme Court does, or should, resolve such conflicts).
133. For more extensive discussion of these values, see Barry Friedman, Valuing
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317, 397-400 (1997) (discussing states as laboratories of
experimentation); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalismand the Uses and Limits ofLaw: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213-14 (1998) (discussing perceived benefits of
federalism); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluatingthe Founders'Design,54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987) (book review) (discussing same). For more skeptical
treatment of these values, see Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism,24 CARDoZO L. REV.
1 (2002) (arguing federalism undercuts the virtues of decentralization); Todd E. Pettys, The
Mobility Paradox,92 GEO. L.J. 481 (2004) (arguing that, at least in some circumstances,
mobile citizens may resist decentralization of federal authority); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm
Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994)
(arguing federalism is both not desirable and not actually our system of government).
134. But see Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrineand Discourse of
Religious Liberty, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1810 (2004) (arguing that resolution of establishment
and free exercise claims under the First Amendment should in part turn on local conditions,
and should not be assumed automatically to have one national resolution).
135. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
136. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 71. Interestingly, Bator was skeptical of the
purported benefits of percolation. See Bator, supra note 92, at 689-91. He particularly
referenced financial and other costs associated with uncertainties of what national law is,
id. at 689-90, and that continued litigation on a particular issue will not necessarily yield
more enlightened results. Id. at 690-91. Various empirical assumptions underlie some of
Bator's analysis which, by my reading, are undermined to a degree by the scholarship of
Arthur Hellman. See supra note 132.
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In a similar fashion, Judge Richard Posner has argued that the
need for uniformity in federal law can be examined from the
perspective of interstate spillovers.13 v He contends that national
law is most appropriate to combat interstate externalities, by
preventing localities from imposing costs on out-of-staters.138 From
this perspective, it appears, some disuniformity in federal law is
tolerable. Consider federal constitutional rights conferred by the
Bill of Rights or by the Fourteenth Amendment. Most such rights,
he says,
are simply unrelated to externalities or related to them only
tenuously. Consider the oppression of blacks by the southern
states after Reconstruction. Unless one treats moral outrage as
a cost-a step that pretty much erases the distinction between
internal and external cost-the costs of that oppression were
borne mainly by the southern rather than the northern states ....
Even more clearly, rights against age discrimination, sex
discrimination, cruel and unusual punishments, double jeopardy, ineffective counsel in criminal cases, and similar rights
that occupy much of the attention of the federal
courts today
9
have little to do with interstate spillovers.13
This seems largely correct. The perpetrators and targets of constitutional rights violations will
often, it seems, though of course not
140
always, be from one state.
41
None of this is an argument against the creation of federal law.1
It simply means that disuniform federal constitutional law is
prevalent and, in some and perhaps many instances, not especially
137. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 280-92
(1996).
138. See id. at 281-84. Posner is speaking primarily of the allocation of cases and causes
of action between federal and state courts, but his point applies as well to the need for

uniform, federal constitutional and statutory law in the first instance. See id. at 295-96.
139. Id. at 288-89.
140. Cf. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987)
("[T]he typical § 1983 suit ... most commonly involves a dispute wholly within one State.").
141. Cf. POSNER, supra note 137, at 289 (arguing that even rights that have little to do
with interstate spillovers may be appropriate to be enforced by federal judges, given the
latter's Article III protections, expertise in enforcing federal law, and the fact that such
rights "are likely to be asserted by people who are politically disfavored in state courts not
because they are nonresidents-most of them are residents-but because, being poor or
otherwise on the social margins, they lack political influence").
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problematic. To be sure, in some instances there will be interstate
externalities; or lack of uniformity will generate litigation, inhibit
planning, and lead to other costs; 142 or that on some issues federal
resolution of an issue will be normatively desirable. 143 That all
said, it would seem that the "federal monopoly" Bator spoke of is
unnecessary.

142. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 71; see Robert W. Hahn et al., Federalismand
Regulation, REGULATION, Winter 2003-2004, at 46.
143. Irrespective of the presence or absence of interstate externalities, the desirability of
fashioning uniform, national law "unavoidably seems to have a normative component."
Michael E. Solimine, Competitive Federalism and Interstate Recognition of Marriage, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 83, 91 (1998); see, e.g., John Kincaid, Extinguishing the Twin Relics of
BarbaricMulticulturalism-Slaveryand Polygamy-from American Federalism,33 PUBLIUS:
J. FEDERALISM, Winter 2003, at 75, 76 (abolishing slavery and polygamy demonstrates that
"the federal Constitution is premised on liberal individualism and is thus hostile to
governmental institutionalizations of territorial multiculturalism"). But see Nelson Lund &
John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and JudicialHubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1599
n.165 (2004) (arguing that the national solution to racial discrimination embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment is consistent with federalism as it "was adopted after experience had
demonstrated that competitive federalism did not provide adequate protection for the exslaves and their descendants"); Solimine, supra, at 89-91 n.30 (arguing that national
solutions to slavery and polygamy are justifiable, in part, on interstate externality grounds).
Another recent example of a federalism debate dominated by normative concerns is that
of same-sex marriage. Many proponents and opponents of gay marriage seem to be calling
for a national, uniform resolution of the issue. For example, the proposed amendment to the
U.S. Constitution endorsed by President Bush in the spring of 2004 would have seemingly
barred the federal government or any state from recognizing gay marriage. See Elisabeth
Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at
Al. Others, in contrast, have argued that the issue should not be resolved in a uniform
manner and ought to be left to the individual states as laboratories of experimentation and
for other federalist reasons. See, e.g., JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR
GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA 174-78 (2004); Michael S. Greve, SameSex Marriage:Commit It to the States, FEDERALISTOUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol'y
Research) Mar. 2004, at 1; Richard A. Posner, Wedding Bell Blues, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22,
2003, at 33, 36-37 (book review); Cass R. Sunstein, FederalAppeal, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22,
2003, at 21, 22-23; John Yoo, Let States Decide, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2004, at A8. But see
David Frum, The MarriageBuffet, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2003, at A22 ("[The result of the]
federalist solution would be that the young people of the country would be presented with
50 different buffets, each of them offering two or more varieties of quasi-marital
relationships. In such a world, the very concept of marriage would vanish.").
For further discussion of the fact and desirability of leaving difficult public policy issues
raising moral questions to state, rather than national, resolution, see Kimberly A.
Hendrickson, The Survival of Moral Federalism, PUB. INT., Summer 2002, at 96; Lund &
McGinnis, supra, at 1598-1604; Alan Wolfe, Moral Federalism, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Summer 2000, at 49.
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III. PROSPECTS FOR PARITY

Much discourse on parity is characterized by its static nature.
The respective capabilities of federal and state courts are often
described as snapshots, taken at the time of the writing. The better
view is to examine parity as a fluid and dynamic concept, with
changes-for good or ill-in both federal and state courts over
time.' This Part will examine how two aspects of state courts have
changed, and possibly will continue to change into the future: (1)
the adoption by states of federal procedure for use in their own
courts; and (2) changes in state judicial selection systems. 4 '
144. As Bator put it:
I hope I have persuaded you that, no matter where we draw the line, it is
virtually inevitable that the state courts will in fact continue to be asked to play
a substantial role in the formulation and application of federal constitutional
principles; the arguments in favor of the federal forum will not lead to a
monopoly. If this is so, a new problem of fundamental significance emerges: we
must try to create conditions to assure optimal performance by the state courts.
Since it is given that they will continue to play a role, we might even ask how
their performance can be improved. The comparative competence argument
tends to assume a static universe. But in creating institutional designs, it is a
mistake to think in static terms; the problem is, at least in part, a process
problem. It is not enough to assert that the federal forum may be the more
hospitable forum; we must also create conditions for assuring that the state
courts will become a more hospitable forum, that the rhetoric of parity becomes
a reality.
Bator, supra note 2, at 624; see also Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44
VAND. L. REv. 953 (1991) (discussing situations where it is appropriate for federal courts to
defer to state court resolution of federal law).
145. There are, of course, other aspects of state courts and of law generated in those courts
that is worthy of future study. Those topics could include:
(1) The interaction and cross-fertilization of federal constitutional law and state
constitutional law. For some suggestions, see SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note
1, at 117 (discussing the development of state constitutional law in death
penalty jurisprudence and its possible effects on federal law); Joseph T. Walsh,
The Evolving Role of State ConstitutionalLaw in Death PenaltyAdjudication,
59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 341 (2003) (discussing same). See generally
Gardner, supra note 128, at 1037-43 (discussing other examples).
(2) Revisiting the rational allocation of cases between federal and state courts,
as a matter of current doctrine and statutes, or as the current allocation
doctrine and statutes might be changed. For some suggestions, see POSNER,
supranote 137, at 280-92; Guido Calabresi, Federaland State Courts:Restoring
a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1293 (2003); Friedman, supra note 5.
(3) How international law could or should affect the adjudication of federal and
state constitutional rights in state courts. For a sample of the literature, see
Mark Tushnet, Federalism and International Human Rights in the New

1488

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1457

A. Convergence of Federaland State Practice
Well over half of the states model some of their important rules
of practice on the federal rules. Thirty-two states, by court rule or
statute, substantially replicate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 146 As of 2004, forty-one states have adopted various versions
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 147 In addition, most states have
adopted versions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 148 I
have previously argued that the adoption of federal rules by state
149
courts is some evidence of parity.
Of course, this phenomenon cannot bear a great deal of weight.
Although the formal rules of procedure followed in state court
systems are important, no less important is how judges and lawyers
in those systems implement the rules in day-to-day litigation. We
have much less information on this. Many states, moreover, have
not modeled their important rules after the federal rules."'5 Even in
Constitutional Order, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 841 (2001); Penny J. White, Legal,
Political,and EthicalHurdles to Applying InternationalHuman Rights Law in
the State Courts of the United States (and Arguments for Scaling Them), 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 937 (2003); Donald E. Childress III, Note, Using Comparative
ConstitutionalLaw to Resolve Domestic Federal Questions, 53 DUKE L.J. 193
(2003).
(4) The role of the executive and legislative branches of states in enforcing
federal constitutional and statutory rights, and of parallel state rights. For
discussions of this point, see Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of
the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529 (2000); Lauren K. Robel,

Sovereignty and Democracy: The States' Obligations to Their Citizens Under
FederalStatutory Law, 78 IND. L.J. 543 (2003).

146. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The FederalRules in State Courts:A Survey
of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure,61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1377-78 (1986).
147. See 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5009 (Supp. 2004) (listing states).

148. See Jerold Israel, FederalCriminalProcedureas a Model for the States, 543 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 130 (1996). Much state criminal procedure, of course, is in the
form of United States Supreme Court interpretation of the Bill of Rights, given the
incorporation of most of those provisions to the states.
149. See SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 38 n.29, 81-82; see also Helen Hershkoff,
PositiveRights and State Constitutions:The Limits of FederalRationalityReview, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1131, 1177-79 (1999) (expressing confidence that state courts, in complex state

constitutional law litigation, can efficiently gather and process facts by, among others, using
amicus briefs and special masters).
150. On the other hand, the procedural rules or codes of those states are nonetheless, in
many instances, similar to those in federal courts. Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures
of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1155 (1986). For a careful survey of practice in
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those states that have, the rules may not necessarily have kept
pace with changes to the federal model. With respect to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, John Oakley recently observed that "[f]ederal procedure is less influential in state courts
today than at anytime in the past quarter-century."'' In particular,
almost all of those jurisdictions that adopted versions of the federal
rules have not amended their own rules to keep pace with changes
to the federal rules. 5 s In these circumstances, precise congruence
between federal and state procedure cannot be regarded as a
controlling measure.
That said, any casual student of procedure will quickly come to
realize that the procedures followed to adjudicate a right can have
a powerful effect on the outcome. For that reason, the Supreme
Court has long invalidated state procedure that, in various ways,
improperly impacts the vindication of a federal right.'5 3 Wherever
it is proper to draw that line,' federal and, indeed, state judges are
three such states-Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Nebraska-with respect to pleading practice
in civil rights and other cases, see Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the
Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States that Have Not
Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,46 VILL. L. REV. 311 (2001).
151. John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the FederalRules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354,
355 (2002/2003).
152. See id. at 354-55, 382-83. The lack of conformity can be attributed to, among other
things, the number and rapidity of amendments to the federal rules, as well as to the
controversial nature of some of them, even within the federal system (e.g., automatic
disclosure in discovery). Carl Tobias, The Past and Future of the Federal Rules in State
Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 400, 403 (2002/2003).
153. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 153
(1988) (holding that Wisconsin notice of claim statute is preempted when § 1983 actions are
brought in state courts). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 23, at 453-64
(discussing when federal procedure must be used instead of state procedure when federal
causes of action are litigated in state court). Many of the cases involve various state rules of
substance or procedure applied to federal civil causes of action litigated in state courts. Some
of these causes of action (e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983) will involve federal constitutional rights.
154. See generally Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity:Section 1983 and the State Courts,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1057 (1989) (exploring means of resolving inconsistencies between state
and federal procedure); Vicki C. Jackson, Printz and Testa., The Infrastructure of Federal
Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REV. 111 (1998) (noting that the federal government's authority does
not necessarily allow it to exercise complete power over state courts); Martin H. Redish &
Steven G. Sklaver, FederalPower to Commandeer State Courts:Implicationsfor the Theory
of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71 (1998) (discussing the ability of the federal
government to commandeer state courts and the implications of that power); Michael E.
Solimine, Enforcement and Interpretationof Settlements of FederalCivil Rights Actions, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 295 (1988) (discussing issues concerning the settlement of civil rights cases).
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thus empowered to set aside state procedural law that will unduly
interfere with the proper adjudication of federal constitutional
rights. 155
In a similar fashion, Congress has considerable authority to pass
legislation that encourages or imposes changes on procedures in
56
state courts, beyond that mandated by federal constitutional law.1
Wholesale preemption of state procedure in this way is both unlikely and unnecessary. Instead, Congress has selectively intervened to encourage or mandate changes in state court procedures
that may affect the adjudication of federal rights. As one example,
in 1996 Congress passed legislation that places restrictions on state
prisoners seeking habeas relief in capital cases, but only when the
state establishes a mechanism providing for competent counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings.'5 7 A second example occurred in
2003 and 2004, when Congress was considering legislation that
would grant states money to defray the costs of DNA testing for
inmates claiming wrongful conviction who met certain criteria, and
to eliminate a backlog of DNA samples submitted for analysis by
rape victims. ' Congress can thus join the federal courts to monitor,
and in some instances, regulate, procedural processes in state civil
and criminal cases that implicate federal constitutional rights.

155. For a survey of various state procedures that might be subject to preemption in this
regard, see Burt Neuborne, Toward ProceduralParity in ConstitutionLitigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 725, 780-86 (1981) (discussing rules regarding attorneys fees, defenses and
immunities, pleadings, class actions, statutes of limitations, and discovery). For a similar
survey, see Herman, supra note 154, at 1113-34.
156. The Supreme Court recently reiterated that authority. See Jinks v. Richland County,
538 U.S. 456 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), mandating that
state courts toll the running of any statute of limitations while claims within supplemental
jurisdiction of a federal court are adjudicated there, before dismissal without prejudice);
Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal
statute regulating certain aspects of discovery in state court).
157. The legislation is a provision of the AEDPA, codified in various sections of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2261-2266. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 23, at 1301-02. So far, only Arizona has
qualified for these provisions. See Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2002). But see
James S. Liebman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 334 n.84
(2002) (criticizing the failure of states to be "willing to provide the resources needed to qualify
for the significant habeas advantages the Act would then make available").
158. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Add-Ons End Years of Wrangling, Clear Path for DNA Testing
Bill, CONG. Q. WKLY., Oct. 16, 2004, at 2442.
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B. State JudicialSelection Reforms
One factor frequently cited by critics of parity is that state courts

are called upon, like federal courts, to enforce federal constitutional
rights that are frequently counter-majoritarian in nature. Most
state judges, unlike their federal counterparts, are subject to
periodic election of some sort. As a result, the fear is that state
judges will be beholden to the electorate and less than enthusiastic
about giving a fair hearing to persons who advance those rights.
Bator acknowledged these points but argued that they were
overstated." 9 The proper comparison, he said, was "between the
federal courts and the entire hierarchy of state courts."'" Although
many are elected, he conceded, at least "at the state supreme court
level, terms tend to be long enough to assure that at least the
grosser threats to judicial independence are absent," '' and "in
many states," he asserted, "the election of state supreme court
judges is largely a formality."'6 2
Bator, in my view, got this about half right. Most state judges are
subject to some sort of periodic election. As of today, thirty-nine
6 3
states have some type of election for some or all of their judges.1
Despite this apparent great potential for public pressure, there is
considerable (if indirect) evidence that, on the whole, little such
pressure takes place. The reason is that considerable systematic
evidence, collected by political scientists, demonstrates that most
judicial elections are qualitatively different from many elections for
the other branches of government. For example, judicial elections
159. See Bator, supra note 2, at 629.
160. Id. at 630.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 630 n.62.
163. To briefly summarize: for state supreme courts, thirty-eight have partisan (six courts)
or nonpartisan (fifteen) elections, or uncontested retention elections after initial appointment
(seventeen). For those thirty-nine states with intermediate appellate courts, seventeen have
partisan (five courts) or nonpartisan (twelve) elections, while fourteen have uncontested
retention elections after initial appointment. For trial courts of general jurisdiction, twentyeight states have partisan (eight) or nonpartisan (twenty) elections, four states use a
combination of elections, while seven use uncontested retention elections. For complete
compilations of each state's laws on judicial elections, see Mark A. Behrens & Cary
Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court
Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoLy 273, 314-60 (2002).
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are typically low-key affairs, with low turnout and considerable
voter roll-off (i.e., voters casting ballots for other races but declining
to cast ballots for judicial races)."' Few voters have information
about judges as candidates, and, as a result, heavily rely on such
cues as party affiliation, name recognition, or incumbency.16 Many
judges first obtain their office by appointment to fill a vacancy, and
regardless of whether they are incumbents, most judges in putatively contested elections run unopposed.1 66 In light of these factors,
then, it seems there is little evidence to suggest state judges are
regularly "punished" at the polls for enforcing federal constitutional
rights.
One can turn this lack of an electoral check around, and argue
that it demonstrates that at least some of these judges are beholden
to local elites, and thus (presumably) unlikely to rock the boat by
going out of their way to enforce federal rights.'6 7 More importantly,
and contrary to Bator's arguments, there is indeed increasing
evidence that many elections for state supreme courts are hotly
contested, costly, and highly politicized affairs.1 6 s And although
164. See SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 41.
165. See id.
166. Id. For a review of the considerable evidence to support these assertions, up to 1999,
see SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 1, at 41-42. See also Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial
Retention Elections, 1964-1998,83 JUDICATURE 79 (1999) (noting that fewer judges are being
defeated, they are receiving an ever-growing affirmative vote, and retention elections are
drawing an increasing number of voters). For a sample of the literature since then, see
Lawrence Baum, JudicialElections and JudicialIndependence: The Voter's Perspective, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 13 (2003) (examining the influence of elections on judicial independence from
the viewpoint of voters); Michael W. Bowers, Judicial Selection in the States: What Do We
Know and When Did We Know It?, 2 RES. JuD. SELECTION 3 (2002) (examining methods of
judicial selection and assessing whether they satisfy their objectives); Gregory A. Huber &
Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?,
48 AM. J. POL. ScI. 247 (2004) (constructing a theory of sentencing and electoral control);
Michael E. Solimine, The False Promiseof JudicialElections in Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 559
(2002) (examining Ohio's recent use of judicial elections as a means of determining whether
this form ofjudicial selection has significant value); Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect:
A Case Study of JudicialSelection in New York City 1977-2002,37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791
(2004) (examining the politicization of New York City elections).
167. See Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 726-42 (1995) (discussing the dangers of elective judiciaries);
Huber & Gordon, supranote 166, at 249 (considering the electoral incentives of trial judges).
168. For a discussion of numerous examples from the 1990s to the present, see AM. BAR
ASS'N, JUSTICE INJEOPARDY: REPORT OFTHEAMERICAN BARASsOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE
21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 18-36 (2003) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]; Owen G. Abbe & Paul S.
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most of the controversy is driven by decisions on state law (e.g.,
challenges under state constitutions to tort reform legislation),' 6 9
there are some examples of state supreme court justices being
challenged and sometimes defeated for their voting in criminal
justice death penalty cases (which often, though not always, turn on
federal constitutional issues). 7 ° Likewise, there is some evidence
that supreme court justices, in states with the death penalty, vote
to uphold capital convictions and sentences in election
more often
17 1
years.

Still, it is not unfair to call these exceptions to the rule of lowprofile judicial campaigns. The majoritarian pressures of the
exceptions are indeed troubling, but they do not support a conclusion that state judges, at any level, are systematically forfeiting
federal constitutional rights due to a fear of the electorate. 172 More
empirical research on this point would nevertheless be welcome.171
Herrnson, How Judicial Election Campaigns Have Changed, 85 JUDICATURE 286 (2002)
(detailing the shift to competitive elections); Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the
Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973 (2001) (discussing the positive and negative aspects of popular
elections); Paul D. Carrington, JudicialIndependence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 79 (considering means
of lowering the risks associated with elections); Clive S. Thomas et al., Interest Groups and
State Court Elections:A New Era and Its Challenges, 87 JUDICATURE 135 (2003) (discussing
the notion that judicial election campaigns are becoming increasingly political). But cf. Chris
W. Bonneau, Patternsof Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition in State Supreme
Court Elections, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 21, 35 (2004) (documenting increased spending for and
competitiveness of state supreme court elections, but arguing that further research is
necessary to establish linkages between the two).
169. See ABA REPORT, supra note 168, at 20-22 (giving examples from numerous states).
170. Id. at 19-20; see Bowers, supra note 166, at 11 (discussing examples from California);

see also Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the Death
Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 596 (2004) (discussing effect of media attention on
decisions by state judges in death penalty cases).
171. See Brace & Hall, supra note 65, at 1223; Gelman et al., supra note 64, at 230-31.
172. See Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure: State
ConstitutionalLaw and Selective Disincorporation,87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 78-82
(1996).
173. For some suggestive studies in this regard, see Francine Sanders Romero et al., The
Influence of SelectionMethod on RacialDiscriminationCases:A LongitudinalState Supreme
CourtAnalysis, 2 RES. JUD. SELECTION 19, 29-30 (2002) (noting that a study of 126 cases from
state supreme courts from 1955 to 1996 involving racial discrimination-including but not
limited to federal constitutional law cases--showed that selection system was not related to
outcome); Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in PersonalJurisdiction, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 1, 51-52 (1998) (highlighting a study of state supreme court decisions from 1970 to 1995
involving personal jurisdiction, which showed that selection system had little effect).
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In the short term, at least, there is little prospect that current
elective systems will change. Rhode Island was the last state to
adopt a form of merit election for its judges, 1 74 in 1994,175 and there
has been little overall movement to that method in the past couple
of decades. Indeed, several states have expressly rejected proposed
adoptions of merit elections in that time period. 7 1 In the short
term, again, the trend toward more contentious campaigns for
judicial office will be exacerbated by the Supreme Court's decision
in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 1 77 which held certain
ethical limits for such campaigns unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. 8
Yet, counterveiling trends will be at work, as well. Virtually all
lower court judicial races will remain relatively quiet. And even for
the high profile positions on state supreme courts, various measures may serve to ameliorate the perceived pathologies of contested and contentious elections. Such measures would include
lengthening terms of office, increasing salaries to attract qualified
lawyers from the private sector, raising the minimum qualifications
to be a judge, publicly financing judicial campaigns, providing for
increased disclosure (particularly by interest groups) of contributions to judicial campaigns, and using voter guides to educate the
public in such elections. 9
174. Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 852 (2002).
175. Barton P. Jenks, III, Essay, Rhode Island's New Judicial Merit Selection Law, 1
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 63, 64-65 (1996).
176. See Bierman, supra note 174, at 851, 852, 862-63; G. Alan Tarr, Rethinking the
Selection of State Supreme Court Justices,39 WILLAME77E L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2003); see also
F. Andrew Hanssen, LearningAbout Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the
State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 453-65 (2004) (discussing various reasons states have
not adopted merit selection).
177. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
178. Id. at 788. For a discussion of the likely effect of White, see ABA REPORT, supra note
168, at 29-30; Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualificationor Suppression: Due Processand the
Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (2004); Brendan H.
Chandonnet, Note, The IncreasingPoliticizationoftheAmerican Judiciary:Republican Party

of Minnesota v. White and Its Effects on Future Judicial Selection in State Courts, 12 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2004).

179. For an extensive discussion of these alternatives, see ABA REPORT, supra note 168,
at 74-82; David C. Brody, The RelationshipBetween JudicialPerformance Evaluationsand
JudicialElections, 87 JUDICATURE 168 (2004); Thomas et al., supranote 168, at 143-44.
Charlie Geyh, the reporter for the ABA's recent extensive report on state judicial elections,
see ABA REPORT, supra note 168, at xi, has recently argued that the sort of incremental
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CONCLUSION

I conclude where I began. In his article, Professor Bator observed
that his objective was not to revisit the entire corpus of legal and
policy issues concerning the adjudication of federal constitutional
issues in state courts. Rather, he said, his purpose was "a narrower
one: to demonstrate that the state courts will and should continue
to play a substantial role in the elaboration of federal constitutional
principles." ' He concluded that "state courts are and should be
seen as a valuable and enriching resource when they participate in
the great task of federal constitutional lawmaking." '
Although perhaps not particularly paradigm-shifting today,
Bator's words were near revolutionary two decades ago. At least in
academia, there was great skepticism of the ability or willingness
of most state courts and state judges to enforce federal constitutional norms. Only a few years earlier, the skepticism had been
bolstered greatly by Burt Neuborne's justly influential critique of
many of the explicit or implicit empirical underpinnings of parity.182
reforms described in the text have, and will continue to, fail, because "judicial elections are
ultimately unsalvageable as a means to promote judicial accountability" or independence.
Charles Gardner Geyh, Why JudicialElectionsStink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43,44 (2003). He goes
on to outline strategies for convincing states eventually to abandon judicial elections entirely.
See id. at 72-79. I sympathize with Geyh's goals, but I do not entirely share his pessimism
regarding the efficacy of the concededly incremental reforms. First, those reforms, if taken
seriously, have the potential to blunt many of the problems associated with these elections.
See Abrahamson, supra note 168, at 977-78, 992-1003 (advancing this point at greater
length). Second, evaluations of electoral systems should not escape comparative treatment,
and on that score it is arguable that some of the characteristics of state judicial races (i.e.,
ill-informed voters; high re-election rates for incumbents) are often shared by elections for
nonjudicial offices in the states (and, indeed, for federal offices). See Chris W. Bonneau &
Melinda Gann Hall, PredictingChallengers in State Supreme Court Elections: Context and
the Politics of Institutional Design, 56 POL. RES. Q. 337 (2003); Melinda Gann Hall, State
Supreme Courts in American Democracy:Probingthe Myths of JudicialReform, 95AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 315, 319 (2001). Third, as I discussed in Part I, I am not convinced that state
judicial elections, on the whole, have been a disaster, or even especially problematic for, the
enforcement of federal constitutional rights by state courts. None of which is to say that
parity has benefitted by the presence of the state court elections, or that non-elective forms
of judicial selections are not worth exploring or implementing.
180. Bator, supra note 2, at 636-37.
181. Id. at 637.
182. See Neuborne, supra note 28. Much of the academic literature of the time was also
critical of parity. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1st ed. 1980).
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Since Bator wrote, the literature on parity has been enriched by
a variety of theoretical and empirical perspectives. My objective in
this paper has been narrow, as well. I have attempted to demonstrate that it is a worthwhile project to unpack and, to the extent
possible, empirically examine the institutional settings of state
courts. Permitting and encouraging state courts to adjudicate
federal rights nevertheless raises a variety of concerns regarding
the uniformity and coherence of federal law. The bottom line is that
parity is a multifaceted concept, one that cannot be the subject of
binary evaluation. It is inappropriate to ask whether parity exists,
or to ask whether parity is a myth. Yet, there are so many federal
and state judges, adjudicating so many different federal claims in
different contexts, that it is absurd to come to simplistic conclusions
on the past and present scope of parity."8 3
Perhaps this is an easy time to examine (and, for some of us, to
defend) parity. Henry Monaghan has recently suggested that the
current relationship between the Supreme Court and state courts
is, on the whole, a "very amicable" one, but, he says, it would be a
mistake to automatically assume that the relationship is
"unproblematic and enduring."'" Rather, he continues, resistance
to full implementation of federal constitutional norms can occur "at
the retail level. While we see little evidence of that today, today is
today, not yesterday, and not tomorrow."'8 5 So, too, neither the
183.
Disparity abounds. Some state systems are better than other state systems;
some state judges are wiser or fairer than other state judges; some state
supreme courts are more willing to interpret state constitutional law more
expansively than federal constitutional law. Some federal circuits are better
than other federal circuits; some federal circuit panels within one circuit are
more likely to uphold claims of constitutional rights; some federal district
judges are more sympathetic to First Amendment claims than to Fourth
Amendment claims. And, yes, some federal judges are wiser, fairer, braver, or
more proplaintiff than some state judges. In a given city, the state judges may
on the average be more liberal than the local federal district judge. And the
Supreme Court over the years varies in how much it protects constitutional
rights. Disparity is real life. But is it so permanent and one-sided that
jurisdictional doctrine should be designed to rescue federal claimants from the
state courts?
Althouse, supra note 144, at 1004.
184. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-CourtDeterminationsof State
Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1965 (2003).
185. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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concept of parity nor its study can be static. Studying and evaluating parity in the future will no doubt continue to be a challenging
and enriching endeavor, for both its supporters and its skeptics.

